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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Studies  report  that  ﬁrms  do not  invest  in cost-effective  green  technologies.  While  economic
barriers  can  explain  parts  of  the  gap,  behavioural  aspects  cause  further  under-valuation.
This  could  be partly  due  to  systematic  deviations  of  decision-making  agents’  percep-
tions  from  normative  benchmarks,  and  partly  due  to  their diversity.  This  paper  combines
available  behavioural  knowledge  into  a simple  model  of  technology  adoption.  Firms  are
modelled  as  heterogeneous  agents  with  different  behavioural  responses.  To quantify  the
gap, the  model  simulates  their  investment  decisions  from  different  theoretical  perspec-
tives.  While  relevant  parameters  are  uncertain  at the  micro-level,  using  distributed  agent
perspectives  provides  a  realistic  representation  of  the macro  adoption  rate.  The  model  is cal-
ibrated using  audit  data  for proposed  investments  in energy  efﬁcient  electric  motors.  The
inclusion  of behavioural  factors  reduces  signiﬁcantly  expected  adoption  rates:  from  81%
using  a  normative  optimisation  perspective,  down  to 20%  using  a  behavioural  perspective.
The  effectiveness  of various  policies  is tested.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Why  are ﬁrms’ investments in green technologies lower than predicted by engineering studies? Can the gap be sufﬁciently
explained as a rational response to risky future cost-savings and information asymmetries? Or do behavioural aspects cause
a further systematic undervaluation of green technologies compared to contemporary mainstream investment theory? If
so, what implication does this have for policies aimed at increasing such investments?
A green technology is one that generates or facilitates a reduction in environmental externalities relative to the incumbent
(Allan et al., 2014, p. 2). When this is achieved by reducing the input for a given output, a technology potentially reduces
operating costs along with the externality. According to mainstream economic theory, a proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm should
undertake such an investment whenever these future savings outweigh the upfront cost.
However, studies based on engineering data regularly report that seemingly cost-effective green investments are
not undertaken (for a discussion, see Grubb, 2014, p. 132). A reduction of environmental externalities at apparently
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negative cost is consistently found within the literature (Allan et al., 2014). McKinsey and Company (2009) claims that
global CO2 emissions could be reduced by 11Gt per year by investing in cost-effective green technologies, which is not
currently happening. The largest potential is attributed to energy efﬁciency measures, and the gap between realised mar-
ket outcomes and the normative cost-minimising benchmark is referred to as the energy efﬁciency gap (Jaffe and Stavins,
1994).
Considering the gradual process of technology diffusion (e.g. Geels, 2002; Rogers, 2010), it is meaningful to analyse how
ﬁrms decide on a green technology investment when it is directly presented to them, such as after an energy audit. Firms
apparently reject a large fraction of seemingly cost-effective project recommendations, as seen from external engineering
perspectives (Anderson and Newell, 2004). Firms dismissing proﬁtable investments in such a systematic way makes effec-
tive policy-making for stimulating technological change difﬁcult: it becomes unclear how to create fruitful incentives for
technology adoption. In the case of technologies that reduce energy use and emissions, this has important implications for
climate change mitigation policy (Worrell et al., 2009).
There exists a vast quantity of literature that both analyses the scope of the gap, and suggests possible reasons — the so-
called market barriers (Sorrell, 2004; Sorrell et al., 2011). Many studies attempt to realign the observed adoption gap with the
neoclassical theory paradigm, in which the representative agent adopts cost-minimizing or utility-maximising measures.
For example, Sutherland (1991) argues that ﬁrms have rational reasons to reject green technologies, but that these reasons
are mostly omitted in engineering studies — such as hidden costs, risk, imperfect information and capital constraints. As a
result, many investments may  be less proﬁtable than they seem to be.1
While economic barriers can explain parts of the gap, others question the behavioural realism of decision mechanisms
assumed in theories (e.g. DeCanio, 1998; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). First, ﬁrms might not act as proﬁt-maximisers, but
instead look for satisfactory solutions (Simon, 1955). Second, behavioural economics shows that human decisions systemat-
ically violate the axioms of expected utility theory, and are better described based on psychological foundations (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Since decisions of ﬁrms are a combination of human decisions, they can
be subject to the same behavioural biases (Grubb, 2014).
The relevance of behavioural factors for climate and energy policy is now widely acknowledged (Pollitt and Shaorshadze,
2012; Allan et al., 2014). However, there is limited knowledge on what drives people’s and ﬁrms’ behaviour, and how this
inﬂuences aggregate outcomes.
This is particularly relevant in the perspective of sustainability transitions studies, in which the process of decision-
making by agents is often not emphasised, but is at least as important as cultural, regulatory and other contextual factors
that inﬂuence or limit the formation of new socio-technical regimes (e.g. as in Geels, 2002). This type of research can
improve representations of agent behaviour, quantitatively and qualitatively, in the various representations of the ﬁeld (i.e.
the multi-level perspective and technology innovation systems), since it is ultimately agent adoption choices that determine
the successful replacement of old socio-technical regimes by new ones, and the diffusion of innovations out of their niches.
To clarify current understanding and to improve quantitative analysis, we combine known behavioural facts into a
simple aggregate model of decision-making by heterogeneous agents for technology adoption. This allows identiﬁcation
and quantiﬁcation of relevant barriers and behavioural factors, without recourse to unknown variables, and aims at a higher
predictive power when modelling the adoption of a green technology. Finally, it can provide key insight on the likely
effectiveness of policies from a behavioural perspective.
The diverse perception by agents of the proﬁtability of a technology can inﬂuence rates of uptake. Diversity implies
varying adoption thresholds across agents, and is thus partly responsible for the typically observed gradual diffusion of
innovations (Rogers, 2010). Thus, within this model, investment decisions are simulated based on the technological and
behavioural diversity of ﬁrms. It is assumed that a technology has different costs and beneﬁts, as perceived by every single
ﬁrm. Due to heterogeneous decision-making parameters, investment decisions by ﬁrms differ even when faced with the
same problem and data. Furthermore, behavioural aspects include systematic biases in ﬁrms’ perceptions of technological
opportunities. This is typically interpreted with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in which gains and losses
are not valued equally. Thus we combine here both effects of behavioural diversity and of behavioural biases.
To quantify the relevance of behavioural factors compared to a normative benchmark, the model simulates technology
adoption using three different possible types of decision-making — referred to as levels of decision-making: optimizing,
satisﬁcing and behavioural. Each level corresponds to a different point of view on the investment decision, or method for
project evaluation, and thus includes different barriers and degrees of heterogeneity. The model can be used to estimate
and compare the effectiveness of policies according to different levels of decision-making, or theoretical paradigms from
the viewpoint of the modeller.
To demonstrate the model’s abilities, we apply it to a case study of electric motors, which account for 43–46% of global
electricity consumption. It is estimated that cost-effective investments could increase their average efﬁciency by 20–30%
(Waide and Brunner, 2011). Nevertheless, ﬁrms systematically reject these investment possibilities (ibid). To explain this phe-
nomenon, the model simulates these investment decisions on different levels of decison-making. The results are compared
to observed decisions that have been taken by ﬁrms after energy audits.
1 The issue with such a line of reasoning is that it allows accepting the use of an un-falsiﬁable theory, where cause is attributed to unknown variables.
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Fig. 1. Diffusion with heterogeneous adopters. Adapted from Allan et al. (2014).
Policies can be applied to inﬂuence the rate of uptake of green technologies, and we  suggest that these can take two
forms. In the traditional sense, ﬁnancial incentives such as taxes and subsidies can be applied to improve the rate of uptake
— a rate that depends on the level at which decision-making is made, i.e. the method of project assessment by ﬁrms in a
particular situation. However, policies can also seek to change the way in which project assessment is carried out, shifting
the level at which decisions are taken, using methods such as information campaigns. We  show that for electric motors, this
could have a high impact on rates of uptake.
2. Literature review and background
The ﬁeld of sustainability transitions studies (STS) provides a powerful, if mostly qualitative, rationale to describe and
connect the components inﬂuencing the diffusion of green innovations out of their existing niches to the mainstream (e.g.
Geels, 2002, 2005, 2011; Genus and Coles, 2008) and how to foster transitions (e.g. Rotmans et al., 2001). Little quantitative
work, however, characterises how these processes collectively act to make a transition happen (see e.g. Holtz, 2011). A ﬁeld
of research is emerging for modelling sustainability transitions (for a discussion, see Holtz et al., 2015). There, emphasis
is given to path-dependence, complexity and interactions across domains, but perhaps insufﬁcient attention is given to
characterise decision-making at the level of agents. Meanwhile, the parent ﬁeld of evolutionary economics also considers
issues of technological change; and there, more emphasis has been given to quantitative methods (e.g. see Safarzynska and
van den Bergh, 2012; Mercure et al., 2014; Saviotti and Mani, 1995), even if no dominant model yet exists. But concepts
going beyond standard utility theory have generally been considered at the core of evolutionary theories and models of
technological change, in particular bounded rationality (Metcalfe, 1988; Saviotti, 1991), enabling quantitative considerations
to be made. This work thus positions itself within an evolutionary economics perspective; but many of these evolutionary
elements could also be considered in STS (e.g. see the comparison by Safarzyn´ska et al., 2012).
Technology diffusion describes the gradual adoption of innovations by ﬁrms and consumers, which involves choices
to be made. Adopters ﬁrst have to learn about the new technology’s existence and beneﬁts, and then decide whether to
adopt or not. Considering heterogeneous agents in this context implies a gradual diffusion process, as different agents have
different thresholds to their decisions (Rogers, 2010). Many studies show that the process regularly resembles a path similar
to logistic curves (e.g. Grübler and Nakic´enovic´, 1991; Mansﬁeld, 1961; Fisher and Pry, 1971; Marchetti and Nakic´enovic´,
1978; Grübler et al., 1999; Nakic´enovic´, 1986). Wilson and Grubler (2011) identify seven ‘grand patterns’ of technological
transitions. Geels (2002) develops the multi-level perspective to understand technological transitions in a complex societal
context, in which components of incumbent socio-technical regimes (e.g. infrastructure, knowledge, regulatory context,
culture and user practices) inﬂuence their successful or unsuccessful diffusion. However, in all of these analysis perspectives,
the microeconomic picture remains to some degree unclear.
From a microeconomic perspective, a gradual diffusion can be related to changing costs or beneﬁts as perceived by het-
erogeneous adopters with different perspectives (see Fig. 1). Various processes may  change perceived costs and beneﬁts
over time, such that the adoption becomes increasingly attractive. As emphasised by Rogers (2010), heterogeneous char-
acteristics of agents (e.g. risk-aversion, tastes and income) imply different net beneﬁts of adopting a new technology. With
learning-by-doing, gradual cost reductions occurring with cumulative adoptions lead to a self-reinforcing phenomenon
(Arthur, 1989).
Not adopting a green technology deemed proﬁtable, however, constitutes a gap between classical theory and reality. It
can be explained either by assuming that agents act rationally, but do not invest in seemingly proﬁtable technologies due to
economic factors that are omitted in engineering studies — so called market barriers. Or, agents systematically violate the
rationality axioms of expected utility theory — which would constitute irrational behaviour from a neoclassical perspective.
Some studies attempt to explain such recurrent efﬁciency gaps by evoking purely economic factors. Sutherland (1991)
argues that the rejection of green technology investments represents ‘real costs in real markets’: given that many such
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Table  1
Barriers to energy efﬁciency, following Sorrell et al. (2011).
Barrier Summary
Risk The short paybacks required for energy efﬁciency investments may  represent a rational response to risk. This could be
because energy efﬁciency investments represent a higher technological or ﬁnancial risk than other types of
investment, or that business and market uncertainty encourages short time horizons.
Imperfect information Lack of information on energy efﬁciency opportunities may  lead to cost-effective opportunities being missed. In some
cases, imperfect information may  lead to inefﬁcient products driving efﬁcient products out of the market.
Hidden costs Engineering-economic analyses may  fail to account for either the reduction in utility associated with energy efﬁcient
technologies, or the additional costs associated with them. As a consequence, the studies may overestimate energy
efﬁciency potential. Examples of hidden costs include overhead costs for management, disruptions to production, staff
replacement and training, and the costs associated with gathering, analysing and applying information.
Access to capital If an organisation has insufﬁcient capital through internal funds, and has difﬁculty raising additional funds through
borrowing or share issues, energy efﬁcient investments may  be prevented from going ahead. Investment could also be
inhibited by internal capital budgeting procedures, investment appraisal rules and the short-term incentives of energy
management staff.
Split incentives Energy efﬁciency opportunities are likely to be foregone if actors cannot appropriate the beneﬁts of the investment.
For  example, if individual departments within an organisation are not accountable for their energy use they will have
no  incentive to improve energy efﬁciency.
Bounded rationality Owing to constraints on time, attention, and the ability to process information, individuals do not make decisions in
the  manner assumed in economic models. As a consequence, they may  neglect opportunities for improving energy
efﬁciency, even when given good information and appropriate incentives.
investments are illiquid and undiversiﬁable, their rejection is a rational response to risk. The reliance on ‘overlooked’ economic
factors is a common explanation in the literature. However, as Jaffe and Stavins (1994) argue, “such explanations must advance
beyond the tautological assertion that (...) there must be some unobserved adoption costs” (p. 805), which effectively impedes
constructive scientiﬁc thought in this context.
Sorrell (2004) classify different classes of barriers. Sorrell et al. (2011) is widely credited with the standard taxonomy,
used here as fundamental building blocks for our theory.2 Barriers are grouped into six classes (Table 1), and deﬁned as “a
postulated mechanism that inhibits a decision or behaviour that appears to be both energy efﬁcient and economically efﬁcient”
(p. 4).
The central microeconomic theory of choice under risk is expected utility theory (EUT) by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947). EUT can be seen as either a normative or a positive theory; however seeing it as positive requires accepting heroic
assumptions over agents thought processes (rationality). Meanwhile, as a normative theory, it is not restricted in this sense,
and describes a subjective set of objectives. Nevertheless, economists widely apply EUT as a positive description of human
behaviour, arguing their view in this way: so long as deviations by agents from rationality are random and unsystematic,
they are irrelevant on average. Empirical evidence shows, however, that many deviations from EUT are systematic3 as well
as correlated, thus not cancelling out without any impact.
Since most decisions of organisations are made by individuals, ﬁrms display comparable behavioural characteristics
(Shogren and Taylor, 2008; Grubb, 2014). Consequently, the assumption of proﬁt-maximisation may  be an oversimpliﬁed
representation of a ﬁrm’s investment behaviour.
Gillingham et al. (2009) identify three key areas from behavioural economics that are most relevant for energy efﬁciency
policy: bounded rationality, heuristic decision-making and prospect theory.
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) replaces unbounded maximisation with satisﬁcing behaviour. Agents are assumed to
behave rationally, but within cognitive limits. Manifestations are heuristics in the form of rules of thumb or the replacement
of an originally complex decision problem with a simpler, roughly accurate one. One possible implication is that managers
maximise their own utility within the constraint of achieving satisﬁcing (instead of maximal) proﬁts (Williamson, 1967).
For investments, this may  explain why many ﬁrms use simpliﬁed payback thresholds as a key decision criterion (instead of
net-present-value calculations). Even small individual discrepancies between satisﬁcing and optimizing solutions can result
in large deviations of overall market allocations (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985).
Bounded rationality is a concept quite central to evolutionary economics and evolutionary game theory. Having originated
in evolutionary biology (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), evolutionary game theory offers a powerful method to explore social
dynamics (e.g. Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010; Saviotti and Mani, 1995; for a review, see Safarzynska and van den
Bergh, 2010), for instance based on replicator dynamics as a dynamical equation. In that framework, social dynamics are
explained partly through bounded rational decision, partly through multi-agent interactions (e.g. social inﬂuence). This
generally results in complex dynamical models (with attractors; e.g. see the discussion on increasing returns by Arthur,
1989).
2 Although the authors focus on the speciﬁc case of energy efﬁciency investments, the classiﬁcation can easily be applied to any green technology.
3 Prominent examples being the choice paradoxes analysed by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961).
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory as a formal descriptive framework for decision analysis. They
systematically mapped observed contradictions to EUT and conclude that for most decisions, optimality considerations are
less relevant than the question, “What course of action seems most natural in this situation?”  (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1469). For
example, in empirical studies, losses are weighed roughly twice as much as gains (Greene, 2011) — termed as loss aversion.
Overall, prospect theory helps to explain various behavioural biases that are potentially relevant for green technology
investments.
Both bounded rationality and prospect theory provide possible explanations for the energy efﬁciency gap. Both are
consistent with empirical observations that the sensitivity to future cost savings is much lower than to upfront costs: Jaffe and
Stavins (1994) empirically analyse the diffusion of thermal insulation and ﬁnd investments to be three times more sensitive to
upfront subsidies than to the energy price. Hassett and Metcalf (1995) ﬁnd that investments in energy conservation are eight
times more sensitive to tax credits than to electricity price increases. Anderson and Newell (2004) analyse manufacturing
companies’ investment decisions after energy audits and report a sensitivity towards upfront payments that is 40% larger
than to annual savings.
For a perfectly rational investor, a relative change in upfront costs should have the same effect on investment decisions as a
change in discounted expected future payoffs of the same relative magnitude (Allan et al., 2014). The observed overweighting
of upfront costs could therefore indicate systematic behavioural deviations from EUT. Unfortunately, to reliably diagnose a
deviation from utility maximisation, researchers have to know the agents’ true subjective expectations about future payoffs.
In a real world problem, it is likely that a whole variety of subjective decision-making procedures are found, and it would
be impossible to reliably enumerate them when studying, for instance, nation-wide energy policy experiences. However,
it is possible that simpler explanations, not based on EUT and not chosen ad hoc, can be found, which may  provide higher
explanatory power than EUT — as we attempt here.
3. A general positive model and classiﬁcation of decision-making
We  introduce a model of technology adoption that explicitly includes the diversity of agents and systematic behavioural
deviations from EUT. The overarching goal is the simulation of technology adoption and policy outcomes in the context of
different decision-making processes of ﬁrms, i.e. how ﬁrms assess green investment projects.
3.1. Methodology
The model is based on three closely interrelated building blocks: perceptions, heterogeneity and risk.
• Perceptions differ between individuals. The same set of data on an investment may  be interpreted in different ways by
different ﬁrms, and by modellers. All models of decision-making are subjective sets of perspectives.
• Heterogeneity of economic fundamentals and decision-making procedures imply heterogeneous decisions. The adoption of
a homogenous technology may  be proﬁtable for the average ﬁrm, but not for all ﬁrms, due to varying contexts (in contrast
to varying perceptions). The relevant decision criteria are heterogeneous: ﬁrms may  have different planning horizons, and
may use entirely different sets of decision criteria (decision protocols).
• Risk affects ﬁrms’ decisions. From the ﬁrms’ perspective, the proﬁtability of an investment is a risky outcome. This risk is
not necessarily an objective property of the world, but can be seen as a subjective or psychological conception (Crawford-
Brown, 1999).
Given that ﬁrms and individuals within them apply heterogeneous decision protocols, it is generally not possible to
forecast individual choices. However, possible values of parameters used for decisions across individuals in a group are
bounded, and based on plausible assumptions on parameter distributions, it is possible to construct an overview of how the
choices are distributed among a sufﬁciently large number of ﬁrms, as follows.
We deﬁne three levels of decision-making, plus a benchmark level for a representative ﬁrm (see Table 2). Each level
corresponds to the perspective and decision criteria of a speciﬁc hypothetical actor: the engineer, optimizing and satisﬁcing
ﬁrms (acting according to unbounded and bounded rationality), and individuals within ﬁrms.
We use these deﬁnitions to ask the question: if agents were to decide according to the criteria of level X, what would be
the aggregate system level outcome? Different levels will bring different amounts of variations (distributions around EUT)
and biases (systematic deviations from EUT). Depending on their framing, particular problems can be assigned to a particular
level of analysis, and the model can be used to obtain quantitative insight on likely aggregate outcomes of decision-making.
This insight can then be used for two purposes: to estimate the likely effectiveness of particular hypothetical policies, and
to classify impacts of various barriers on outcomes.
For each level, a different subjective decision protocol is formalised. It is assumed for simplicity that each ﬁrm has a binary
choice to adopt a green technology or not, which is compared to an alternative default technology with respect to perceived
investment costs (denoted as C) and perceived future cost-savings (denoted as B). Within the engineering benchmark
and the ﬁrst level, the decision-making protocol involves calculating an investment’s net-present-value (NPV). The decision
criteria for levels 2 and 3 are formulated in a similar way, but using an investment’s perceived net-present-beneﬁt (NPB). On
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Table  2
Levels of decision-making and their analytical relevance.
Level Decision behaviour Actor Deﬁning question
0 Technological Engineer What is cost-effective for a representative ﬁrm from a technological point
of  view?
1  Optimizing Heterogeneous ﬁrms with
unbounded rationality
What should be perceived as individually beneﬁcial for proﬁt-maximising
heterogeneous ﬁrms that decide according to the concepts proposed by
standard micro-economics?
2  Satisﬁcing Heterogeneous ﬁrms as
organisations with bounded
rationality
What should be perceived as individually beneﬁcial for a proﬁt-maximising
ﬁrm, given organisational structures and limited decision resources?
3  Behavioural Heterogeneous individuals
inside heterogeneous
organisations
What is perceived to be individually beneﬁcial by an agent inside a
proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm, given organisational structures, limited cognitive
resources and systematic behavioural deviations from EUT?
Table 3
Levels of decision-making and their parameters.
Level Assumptions Barriers Parameters
0 — Technological Homogenous agents, None Hypothetical baseline
no  risk or uncertainty,
perfect information,
unbounded rationality
1 — Optimizing Heterogeneous agents, + hidden costs Discount rates (ri),
perfect information, + external risk expectations (Ei),
unbounded rationality, + business risk implicit weights ( i)
undiversiﬁable risk + restricted credit heterogeneity in:
+  imperfect information cost and beneﬁts (Ci , Bi),
lifetimes (ni)
2  — Satisﬁcing Heterogeneous agents, + capital budgeting Payback criterion:
undiversiﬁable risk, + split incentives critical thresholds (bi)
ﬁrms as organisations, + limited time
decision constraints + limited resources
3  — Behavioural Heterogeneous agents, + loss aversion Prospect theory loss aversion function:
undiversiﬁable risk, + status quo bias weighting factors (),
ﬁrms as organisations, + values decreasing marginal utility (˛, ˇ)
deviations from EUT
a given level, a ﬁrm is assumed to invest in the green technology if and only if the net-present-value (on level 0 and 1) or
perceived net-present-beneﬁt (on levels 2 and 3) is larger than zero.
In Section 4, the decision protocols are calibrated using a case study on electric motors in industry. Based on audit data,
probability distributions are assigned to all heterogeneous parameters. The outcome variable, net-present-value/beneﬁt,
is a combination of all heterogeneous parameters. In order to combine the heterogeneity of the superposed behavioural
layers, the model evaluates combined distributions of NPB up to each level of decision-making by performing Monte Carlo
simulations.4
The results are interpreted as the investment decisions of a heterogeneous population of ﬁrms. Each element of Monte
Carlo simulations corresponds to the decision of one individual ﬁrm. Based on these simulations, the share of adopters and
non-adopters is compared and visualised for each level of decision-making. The results can be used to identify the robustness
of policies for the levels appropriate to the problem of interest.
3.2. Levels of decision-making
In the following, we  describe the levels of decision-making including the respective assumptions and decision protocols.
Ei(Xi) refers to ﬁrm i’s subjective expectation value of a given X variable (e.g. price of electricity) for ﬁrm i (see Table 3).
3.2.1. Level 0 — Technological
The technological level is a hypothetical baseline. The green technology investment is analysed from an engineering
perspective (e.g. as in McKinsey and Company, 2009),5 assuming a representative ﬁrm that decides according to a perfectly
4 This can equally be done by calculating convolutions of probability distributions with one another.
5 The perspective of the technology developers, and according to them, how the technology is supposed to be used.
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rational decision protocol with inﬁnite amounts of perfectly reliable information taken into consideration (i.e. protocol and
information known by the modeller). There is neither risk nor uncertainty.
According to neoclassical theory, the appropriate decision protocol for a proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm is a net-present-value
(NPV) calculation (Damodaran, 2007): the investment’s value is deﬁned as the present value of its expected cash ﬂows. If
the NPV is positive, an investment should be undertaken.
For the case of green technology investments, it is assumed that the relevant cash ﬂows are the upfront investment costs
(C) in the present period (t = 0) and annual beneﬁts (B) throughout the investment’s lifetime (n) (from t = 0 up to t = n).
Investment costs are either the net cost-difference relative to the default investment (e.g. if retired equipment has to be
replaced) or the green technology’s gross investment costs (e.g. if the investment replaces current equipment prematurely).
Beneﬁts are deﬁned as input cost-savings relative to the default technology: the change in the required quantity (q) of an
input (e.g. electricity) given a constant output, multiplied by the input’s market price (p) (inclusive of any fees and taxes).
From the technological (the technology producer’s) perspective, the green investment is assumed to be risk-free. To account
for the time-value and opportunity cost of money, future cash ﬂows are discounted by a discount rate r (on this level, the
rate of return on risk-free investments).
Given all assumptions, the decision criterion of the representative ﬁrm can be described by formula (1):
NPV := −C +
n∑
t=0
Bt
(1 + r)t
= −C +
n∑
t=0
pt ∗ qt
(1 + r)t
(1)
The resulting decision is a point estimate for a representative ﬁrm, which is used to predict the homogeneous behaviour
of all ﬁrms. This is what might be used for instance in cost-optimisation models, based on averaged technology costs and
beneﬁts.
3.2.2. Level 1 — Optimizing
The optimizing level of decision-making analyses the optimal decisions of ﬁrms according to the principles that are
suggested by neoclassical theory: how should fully rational ﬁrms behave in order to maximise their proﬁts? Compared to
the technological level, there are three main differences.
First, heterogeneity is introduced. A technology is assumed to have different upfront costs (Ci) and beneﬁts (Bi) for
different ﬁrms. The upfront costs depend on various heterogeneous factors, such as staff costs or disruptions in the production
process (Sorrell et al., 2011). In terms of barriers, these differences are referred to as ‘hidden costs’. Individual beneﬁts differ
in a similar way — both due to differences in input prices (pi) and quantities saved (qi) (e.g. due to varying load factors).
Furthermore, overall beneﬁts depend on the investment’s expected useful lifetime (Ei(ni)), which may  differ between ﬁrms
due to heterogeneous expectations about the technological lifetime, as well as heterogeneous planning horizons for the use
of the technology (e.g. due to a planned factory shut-down).
Second, ﬁrms are assumed to differ with regard to capital access. Future cash ﬂows are therefore discounted by individual
ﬁrms’ private discount rates (ri), here deﬁned as a their weighted average cost of capital (WACC). In terms of barriers, ri
represents ‘restricted access to credit’ (e.g. due to being a high risk borrower).
Third, risk and imperfect information are introduced. While ﬁrm i may  know some determinants of future beneﬁts (like
its individual load factor), it has to rely on subjective expectation values (Ei) for others (like the technological lifetime and
future input prices). Furthermore, ﬁrms may  be subject to imperfect or asymmetric information on the technology’s true
performance: if buyers cannot reliably observe promised beneﬁts and sellers cannot credibly communicate them, they might
be rationally ignored in purchase decisions, resulting in adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). The credibility of promised cost-
savings is likely to be higher if a technology’s advantages are well proven or certiﬁed, and lower if not directly observable
(e.g. due to a lack of metering).
From the ﬁrm’s perspective, it could therefore be rational to perform a risk-adjustment of expected beneﬁts (Sutherland,
1991) — depending on individual degrees of risk-aversion, as well as heterogeneous perceptions of the investment’s riskiness
and credibility. Since all this is highly subjective, we restrain from explicitly modelling the corresponding risk-adjustment
by ﬁrms. Instead, based on Allcott and Greenstone (2012), we  deﬁne the parameter  i (between 0 and 1) as an implicit
weight on expected savings in the agent’s decision. From an optimizing point of view, it can be evaluated as a statistic for
all investment inefﬁciencies. Since it is hardly possible to calibrate  i beyond an arbitrary level, it is not used in any of the
following simulations (so by default set to 1). However, we  implicitly estimate  i in the sensitivity analysis by ﬁnding which
average value of  i is consistent with observed investment behaviour when assuming that ﬁrms decide based on level 1.
The resulting decision criterion for heterogeneous optimizing ﬁrms is:
NPVi:= − Ci +
Ei(ni)∑
t=0
i ∗ Ei(Bi,t)
(1 + ri)t
= −Ci +
Ei(ni)∑
t=0
i ∗ Ei(pi,t) ∗ Ei(qi,t)
(1 + ri)t
, (2)
The deﬁning differences to Eq. (1) are to use subjective agent expectations of the future Ei(:) for random variables, i-subscripts
for heterogeneity, private discount rates (ri) and the implicit parameter  i. The respective parameters are assumed to be
different for each ﬁrm. This implies heterogeneous investment decisions, which will result in a distribution of net-present-
values (NPVi). From an optimizing perspective, every ﬁrm with NPVi > 0 should undertake the investment.
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3.2.3. Level 2 — Satisﬁcing
The satisﬁcing level of decision-making focuses on the behaviour of ﬁrms as organisations, taking into account organi-
sational constraints and limited resources for decision-making (time and attention). Graham and Harvey (2001) survey the
budgeting behaviour of ﬁrms in the US and conclude that most do not perform NPV calculations. Instead, 57% ‘always or
almost always’  use a payback-time criterion, which does neither include discounting, nor risk-adjustments. Most importantly,
it ignores all future cash ﬂows after an arbitrary cut-off date.
To account for this observed behaviour, the decision criterion is replaced with a simple payback criterion. Firms are
assumed to compare a green technology’s investment costs with its expected future cost-savings for a limited number of
years, denoted by individual payback thresholds bi. This threshold is commonly found to be between one and ﬁve years,
with a majority of ﬁrms requiring an investment to pay for itself within one to two years (Anderson and Newell, 2004). As
a result, any future cost-savings beyond the cut-off date are ignored.
Given ﬁrms’ constraints on decision-making, the replacement of a NPV calculation with a simpler criterion can still be
interpreted as being optimal within the concept of bounded rationality. For instance, senior staff may  lack the capacity
to monitor all projects. When a green technology investment is perceived as relatively unimportant, it may  be evaluated
under a less demanding basis of payback criteria (Sorrell et al., 2011). Furthermore, short payback thresholds might be a
consequence of split incentives and ‘managerial risk-aversion’ inside an organisation, for example, when the responsible
staff is only evaluated based on short-term goals.
The resulting decision criterion is summarised by Eq. (3).
NPBi := −Ci +
bi∑
t=0
Ei(Bi,t) = −Ci +
bi∑
t=0
[
Ei(pi,t) ∗ Ei(qi,t)
]
(3)
Note that the decision criterion is no longer NPVi. To allow for a comparison between levels, it is instead deﬁned as the
net-present-beneﬁt (NPBi) as perceived by individual organisations.
3.2.4. Level 3 — Behavioural
The behavioural level of decision-making adopts a purely positive perspective. In no way  does it imply how a decision
should be made. Instead, it focuses on the perspective of individuals, working inside heterogeneous organisations — how do
individual decision-makers behave? — taking into account not just organisational structures, but also systematic behavioural
deviations from EUT. The decision is seen here from the perspective of the individual who  is ultimately responsible for the
investment decision, according to internal structures and hierarchies.
According to EUT, a decrease in upfront costs should result in the same utility change as an increase in future beneﬁts
of the same relative magnitude. However, it is a common ﬁnding that decisions on green technology investments are much
more sensitive to the former than the latter (Jaffe et al., 2005). This is likely related to systematic deviations from EUT — such
as loss aversion, status quo bias and the salience effect (Gillingham et al., 2009). In behavioural experiments, individuals
were shown to weigh losses roughly twice as much as gains (Greene, 2011).
In order to model the observed decision behaviour, we here adopt the positive framework of prospect theory. Speciﬁcally,
we use a loss aversion value function as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which conceptualises observed decision-
making based on: (1) reference dependence: gains and losses are deﬁned relative to the status quo as a reference point, (2)
loss aversion: since losses weigh larger than gains, the function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain —
captured by the parameter , (3) diminishing sensitivity:  gains and losses are subject to decreasing valuation, resulting in a
s-shaped function — expressed by the exponents  ˛ (for losses) and  ˇ (for gains). Empirically, it is estimated that  = 2.25 and
 ˛ =  ˇ = 0.88 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), which holds consistently in very different contexts (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).
The decision criterion of level 3 is Eq. (4), with
∑bi
t=0Ei(Bi,t) =
∑bi
t=0
[
Ei(pi,t) ∗ Ei(qi,t)
]
.
NPBi := − ∗ (Ci)ˇ +
⎡
⎣
bi∑
t=0
Ei(Bi,t)
⎤
⎦
˛
= −2.25 ∗ (Ci)0.88 +
⎡
⎣
bi∑
t=0
Ei(Bi,t)
⎤
⎦
0.88
(4)
Note that Eq. (4) is based on the satisﬁcing level, and therefore includes the explicit payback threshold (bi). Given that
individual decision-makers decide within the given organisational constraints of their ﬁrms, it is assumed that the long-term
beneﬁts beyond the cut-off point are not relevant for their individual decision utility.
3.2.5. Level E — Ensemble of all decision types
The different types of decision-making are not meant to be mutually exclusive. Rather, one type of ﬁrm might decide
based on a decision rule similar to the NPV calculation in level 1, while others decide according to rules that are closer to the
payback threshold of level 2. Finally, a remaining fraction of ﬁrms might be subject to the behavioural biases of individual
decision-makers, as described best by level 3.
In reality, a mix  of ﬁrms with different types of decision-making for the given investment is more likely than an exclusive
prevalence of just one type of ﬁrm. To simulate different distributions of decision-making types among ﬁrms, we therefore
construct an ensemble model that contains levels 1, 2 and 3. Each ﬁrm is randomly assigned to one level. The probability
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that an individual ﬁrm belongs to level 1, 2 or 3 is assumed to be exogenously given by p(level = 1), p(level = 2) and p(level = 3),
which sum up to 1.
Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) for decision-making of ﬁrms in the USA, we  use the following default
calibration:
p(level = 1) = 0.4; p(level = 2) = 0.3; p(level = 3) = 0.3 (5)
In a Monte Carlo simulation, these probabilities will equal the fractions of ﬁrms assigned to the different levels. By means
of numerical exploration, the probabilities can be adjusted to any value, in order to analyse the potential effect of any
population composition.
4. Case study: electric motors in the USA
In this section, we parameterise the model using data for energy-efﬁcient electric motors in the USA. We  demonstrate
what can be done with the model and how it can enhance the policy-maker’s understanding of a green technology’s rate
of adoption. As an example, we simulate investment decisions on the different levels of decision-making and compare it
to observed decisions after energy audits. In a situation which otherwise would have been given the un-instructive label
of irrational behaviour,  the model allows for better understanding of the problem, and analysis of the likely effectiveness of
hypothetical policies.
4.1. Background information
The International Energy Agency (Waide and Brunner, 2011) estimates that electric motor driven systems (EMDS) account
for 43–46% of global electricity consumption, causing annual CO2 emissions of roughly 6 Gt. At the same time, the IEA
estimates that the energy efﬁciency of EMDS could be cost-effectively increased by 20–30%.
Throughout a potential lifetime of 20 years, electricity typically accounts for 90% of a motor’s life-cycle costs, compared
to 1% for the purchase price. As a result, even “small gains in energy efﬁciency can be highly cost-effective” (p. 72) and should
more than justify the initially higher investment costs (or even a premature replacement of existing motors). However,
despite the apparent attractiveness of such green investments, the IEA considers their realisation as ‘difﬁcult or impossible’
(p. 13) due to a variety of barriers — for example higher initial costs (Ci) and short-term thinking of ﬁrms (bi). Accordingly,
investment decisions focus on low investment costs, and largely ignore the potential cost-savings.
Within the model, this ‘efﬁciency gap’ corresponds to the engineering perspective of the benchmark level zero — the
technological level of decision-making. However, how are EMDS investments related to the other levels?
4.2. Data and calibration
The model is calibrated to data from the US Department of Energy’s Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC) (Center for
Advanced Energy Studies, 2015), which provide energy audits for small and medium-sized manufacturing companies free
of charge since 1976. Auditing teams perform in-depth assessments of factories. These consist of surveys, engineering
measurements and a two-day site visit. The auditors then provide the respective company with a detailed investment
analysis of projects that were identiﬁed as cost-effective. After six months, auditors perform follow-up interviews on which
projects are implemented (ibid.). The key data of all project recommendations is consistently reported in a public database,
including: estimated investment costs (Ci), estimated annual energy savings (qi), electricity prices (pi) and the ﬁnal
implementation status.
We  focus on audits between 2008 and 2013, assuming that the motor technology throughout this period is roughly
comparable. After removing outliers (with reported investment costs being either zero or unrealistically high), this provides
information on 275 recommendations for the ‘use (of the) most efﬁcient type of electric motors’. Note that this only refers to
a motor’s complete replacement (reconﬁgurations are listed separately), allowing a treatment as a roughly homogenous
investment.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are summarised in Table 4. The data on investment costs and quantities is trans-
formed into relative values ($ per kWh  saved and kWh  saved per $). For illustrative purposes, this data is then scaled to the
median project size (as measured by kWh  saved). All stated costs and prices are expressed in 2013-US-Dollars.
First, the data reveal that there is considerable heterogeneity with respect to estimated investment costs, annual energy
savings and electricity prices (Fig. 3a). Second, calculated payback times are always shorter than an electric motor’s expected
lifetime, and shorter than 8.83 years for 95% of all projects. Therefore, the investment seems indeed to be proﬁtable for all
ﬁrms. Despite these estimations, the observed implementation rate is as low as 45%. This seems to be unrelated to the
considered economic fundamentals: by graphical inspection, project payback times do not differ by implementation status
(see Fig. 2). This indicates the relevance of other levels of decision-making.
The model is calibrated to the IAC data for Ci, qi and pi based on the estimations of median-scaled motor projects (see
Table 5). To avoid having to specify a particular price path, pi is assumed to be constant throughout an investment’s lifetime
(so is qi). Calibrations of discount rates (ri), lifetimes (ni), payback thresholds (bi) and the prospect theory loss aversion
function (, ˛, ˇ) are based on literature estimates.
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Table  4
Summary statistics of motor recommendations (absolute, relative, median).
Variable Unit Mean Median Min. 95% perc. Max. Std. dev.
Absolute:
Ci $ 32 258 8224 264 115 640 993 790 101 190
qi kWh/y 178 250 46 050 999 708 940 5 645 400 496 380
pi $/kWh 0.073 0.070 0.020 0.130 0.220 0.031
Bi $/y 10 293 3319 82 41 693 233 950 23 329
Payback time years 3.34 2.65 0.15 8.83 16.41 2.57
Relative:
Ci/qi $/kWh  0.23 0.19 0.03 0.54 0.79 0.16
qi/Ci kWh/$ 7.56 65.26 1.26 22.44 34.08 6.37
Median  motor:
Ci $ 10 311 8685 1341 24 527 36 256 7270
qi kWh/y 62 205 43 280 10 368 184 550 280 290 52 361
Fig. 2. Relative frequencies of project payback times, grouped by implementation status (green: implemented, red: not implemented). (For interpretation
of  the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 5
Calibration of model parameters to electric motor project recommendations.
Level Variable Distribution Parameter values Source
1 C Weibull shape = 1.51; scale = 11 493.28 Fitted to data from the
p  Weibull shape = 2.46; scale = 0.08 Center for Advanced Energy Studies (2015)
q  Weibull shape = 1.34; scale = 68 426.27
r  Normal  = 8%;  = 3%; min  = 0% Gilchrist et al. (2013)
n Normal  = 15;  = 3; min = 0 Waide and Brunner (2011)
 i — 1 benchmark
2  b Normal  = 2;  = 1; min  = 1; max  = 5 Anderson and Newell (2004)
3  — 2.25 Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
 ˛ — 0.88
ˇ  — 0.88
p(level) Discrete empirical p(level = 1) = 0.4; p(level = 2) = 0.3; p(level = 3) = 0.3 Graham and Harvey (2001)
To allow for Monte Carlo simulations, the empirical data (C, q,  p) is approximated by theoretical distributions. Graph-
ical comparisons with different distribution types as well as bootstrapped Cullen and Frey graphs (plotting the kurtosis
against the squared skewness) indicate that the best ﬁt is given by Weibull distributions. Parameter ﬁtting was  done by
maximum likelihood estimation.
The investment’s expected lifetime (Ei(ni)), cost of capital (ri) and payback thresholds (bi) are approximated by Normal
distributions. bi is truncated between a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 5 years (based on Anderson and Newell,
2004).
4.3. Simulation results
To estimate the share of ﬁrms that would invest in a more efﬁcient motor according to the different levels of decision-
making (referred to as the implementation rate), a Monte Carlo simulation of the calibrated model was run with 10 000 trials.
This enables to combine (or convolve) chains of probability distributions across levels (equivalent to formal mathematical
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Fig. 3. Distributions of simulated NPV/NPB for the modelled levels of decision-making (representations of evaluation methods) 1–3, respectively “Opti-
mizing”, “Satisﬁcing” and “Behavioural” (see text), as well as the model ensemble (mixture of levels). The density estimations are shown with the break
even  line at zero, as well as the point estimate of level 0 as a dashed line.
Table 6
Model simulations for levels 0–3 and the model ensemble — implementation rates (in %) and summary statistics of the simulated NPV/NPB (in US$).
Level NPV > 0 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. dev.
0 — Technological 100.0% 30 144 — — — 0
1  — Optimizing 81% 29 729 18 711 −39 068 476 723 39 815
2  — Satisﬁcing 44% 220 −1391 −44 887 124 314 13 008
3  — Behavioural 20% −4183 −3907 −28 290 25 848 5415
E  — Ensemble 52% 10 750 499 −40 480 335 300 30 474
convolutions). Resulting implementation rates and summary statistics of the NPV/NPB distributions are summarised in
Table 6. Density estimations of the distributions at different levels are depicted in Fig. 3.
First, the model simulation for the optimizing level of decision-making is consistent with the IEA analysis: the investment
in a more energy-efﬁcient motor appears to be proﬁtable for a large majority of 81% of ﬁrms. However, it proves to be
unproﬁtable for the remaining 19%. Although the investment is highly proﬁtable on average (with a mean NPV of 29 729$),
the considered characteristics among ﬁrms are highly heterogeneous. This implies that a fraction of them is characterised
by such combinations of high costs and low beneﬁts that make it perfectly reasonable to dismiss the motor investment.
Second, the simulated implementation rate decreases for the two other levels — from 81% on the optimizing level to
44% on the satisﬁcing level and 20% on the behavioural level. In other words, the distributions of simulated NPBs shift to
the left. At level 3, only one in ﬁve ﬁrms is predicted to invest, although it is seen as cost-effective for four out of ﬁve ﬁrms
from an optimizing perspective. This has to be contemplated in the context of a relatively well-proven and risk-free green
investment, proposed to ﬁrms in the relatively credible form of government-sponsored energy audits.
Third, the input data’s combined heterogeneity translates into even more heterogeneous investment perceptions by ﬁrms,
when evaluated in form of NPVs and NPBs. From the optimizing perspective of level 1, simulated NPVs range from −39 068$
to 476 723$, with a standard deviation of 39 815$ — due to the investment’s heterogeneous economic fundamentals. The
variance decreases along with the levels, which can be explained by two  effects. From level 1 to 2, it decreases along with the
considered time frame. This is because a large part of the variance can be attributed to heterogeneous annual payoffs, and
their relevant magnitude is much smaller when assuming a payback criterion (as on levels 2 and 3) instead of a full lifetime
assessment (as on level 1). On level 3, the prospect theory loss aversion function has two  implications. The overweighting
() of losses associated with the upfront costs decreases perceived NPBs. At the same time, the decreasing marginal utility of
both losses and gains (  ˛ and ˇ) imply a less heterogeneous perception of costs and beneﬁts, further decreasing the variance.
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Finally, the IAC data allows a comparison with the observed implementation rate. 45% of ﬁrms report that they have
implemented the recommended efﬁciency improvement, matching our result for the satisﬁcing level 2 (44%). The large
gap between this rate and the 81% predicted by level 1 (the actual energy efﬁciency gap) can be interpreted as evidence for
organisational and behavioural barriers, e.g. in the form of short-term investment planning and loss aversion. However,
from a policy perspective, this divergence could as well be interpreted as evidence for the audits’ effectiveness: if we are
to believe our model, without it, the implementation rate could have been as low as 20%, the model’s estimation for the
behavioural level 3. By offering technological assistance and pointing out proﬁtable projects, the audits are very likely to
have shifted the decision from the behavioural to the satisﬁcing level.6 As a consequence, the investment decision might be
less prone to behavioural factors than it would have been without the audit.
However, since the input data for many parameters was  estimated and randomly assigned to hypothetical ﬁrms, the
model output can only be interpreted in aggregate. We do not know if ﬁrms really decide based on a decision-making
procedure similar to level 2, of which the prediction roughly matches the observed outcome. From a macro-perspective, it
might as well be that around 40% of ﬁrms are of the optimizing decision type of level 1 (as found by Graham and Harvey,
2001), while the remaining ones are closer to the satisﬁcing or behavioural levels of decision-making. This would result in
an implementation rate of 52%, as demonstrated by the ensemble model. Neither do we know which share of ﬁrms does
actually decide based on level 3 (or might have decided in the absence of any audit), and if the audit indeed shifted the level
of decision-making for some ﬁrms. The fundamental problem here is similar to ‘Schrödinger’s cat’: we can’t measure ﬁrms’
behaviour in the absence of an audit, while the audit itself most likely inﬂuences what we want to measure.
4.4. Sensitivity analysis
To investigate how individual model parameter affect outcomes, one parameter each is replaced with a range of point
estimates. Fig. 4 shows the simulated impacts on implementation rates.
The positive impact of the quantity saved (q) and the electricity price (p) is largest on level 1, on which the decision
criterion accounts for beneﬁts throughout the entire lifetime. It is lower on levels 2 and 3, on which beneﬁts are under-
weighted relative to costs. For the same reason, the negative impact of higher investment costs (C) is largest on level 3, and
lowest on level 1.
The sensitivity towards the discount rate (r) and the parameter  allow an implicit estimation of the effect that imperfect
information and risk aversion need to have on ﬁrms’ valuation of beneﬁts for an explanation based on pure optimizing:
which parameter values are consistent with the observed implementation rate of 45%, assuming that all ﬁrms were deciding
based on level 1? The implicit discount rate is as high as 45%, while the implicit level of  is as low as 0.26 — meaning
that ﬁrms would value potential cost savings at only 26% of their value as promised by energy auditors. However, across
all project categories within the IAC database, only 1.8% of ﬁrms state that ‘risk of problem with product/equipment’  was a
reason for non-adoption (Anderson and Newell, 2004). An explanation purely based on high risk-perceptions and imperfect
information therefore seems unlikely, and would at the very least be insufﬁcient.
All parameters show a decreasing marginal impact — which is relevant for the design of policies. While the simulated
changes in average NPBs are always linear, they translate into a decreasing impact on ﬁrms’ investment decisions — consistent
with the diffusion pattern that results from the distribution of heterogeneous adopters (see Fig. 1). The reason is as follows:
for more extreme parameter values, the linear increase (or decrease) in the mean NPB takes place along the thinner ends
of NPB distributions, so that it encourages (or discourages) less and less ﬁrms to invest. Therefore, the higher the initial
implementation rate, the lower the sensitivity towards p, and the higher the sensitivity towards C.
4.5. Evaluating the effectiveness of hypothetical policies on implementation rates
Here, policies are introduced in the model, aiming at increased implementation rates. From the perspective of welfare
economics, there are at least two rationales for doing so: uninternalised externalities of electricity production and investment
inefﬁciencies in the form of barriers to green technology investments (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012).
4.5.1. Uninternalized externalities: electricity tax
To account for negative externalities (e.g. CO2 emissions), a Pigouvian tax on energy could be introduced, aiming at
lower consumption. For manufacturing ﬁrms, this is equivalent to increasing electricity prices by pi, thereby increasing
the investment’s annual payoff (Ei(Bi,t)). From the optimizing perspective of level 1, a tax should induce fully rational ﬁrms
to substitute away from electricity, and increase investments in green technologies.
Model input: An electricity tax (tax : =+ pi) is simulated as a relative increase in a ﬁrm’s individual electricity price per
kWh (pi) by a tax rate t, so that the electricity price after tax equals (1 + t) * pi.
6 However this would remain to be proven, which cannot be done with the current data, as it would require similar data in a counterfactual situation
without energy audits, but the audits are the actual source of the data.
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Fig. 4. Sensitivity of the implementation rate (on different levels) against the main model parameters: electricity price (p), quantity saved (Q), investment
cost  (C), payback threshold (b), discount rate (r), gamma  value. Colours represent the different levels of decision-making. (For interpretation of the references
to  colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 7
Model simulations for the potential effectiveness of a 7% tax and a 27% subsidy on the mean NPB and the implementation rate in absolute terms (increase
in  percentage points) and relative terms (percentage increase). Policy rates are chosen so that average subsidy payments equal average discounted tax
savings.
Level Impact on mean NPB Absolute impact on imp. rates Relative impact on imp. rates
7% tax 27% subsidy 7% tax 27% subsidy 7% tax 27% subsidy Relative effect subsidy/tax
1 — Optimizing +2812$ +2821$ +1.2pp +5.2pp +1.5% +6.4% 4.3
2  — Satisﬁcing +742$ +2 821$ +2.0pp +9.6pp +4.5% +21.8% 4.80
3  — Behavioural +204$ +1 830$ +1.5pp +7.3pp +7.7% +37.6% 4.87
4.5.2. Investment inefﬁciencies: subsidies
When ﬁrms’ decisions focus on upfront costs relative to future payoffs, this constitutes an investment inefﬁciency.
Reduced investment costs then promise a more effective leverage on decisions, and capital subsidies (−Ci) could be socially
beneﬁcial (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012).
Model input: A subsidy scheme (subsidy = : − Ci) is simulated as a relative reduction in ﬁrms’ upfront investment costs
(Ci) by a subsidy rate s, so that the investment costs after the subsidy equal (1 − s) * Ci.
4.5.3. The impact of ﬁnancial incentives
Simulation results for different policy levels are depicted in Fig. 5, and exemplarily summarised in Table 7. Fig. 6 illustrates
the potential effect of shifting ﬁrms’ level of decision-making. To allow an easier comparison between tax and policy,
simulated tax rates (0–30%) are chosen so that for the average ﬁrm, the resulting sums of discounted tax savings are in the
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Fig. 5. Model simulations for policy effectiveness — implementation rates (%), simulated NPV/NPB (thousands US$) and marginal impact on implementation
rates  (p.p.). Absolute US$ values are average values (for the tax: sum of discounted tax savings). Colours represent the different levels of decision-making
of  “optimizing” (blue), “satisﬁcing” (green), “behavioural” (red) and ensemble (black, see text for details). (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this  ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Simulation of policies that aim at changing the level of decision-making of ﬁrms (or evaluation method): predicted implementation rate for
an  ensemble in which ﬁrms ﬁrst gradually change from the “behavioural” level 3 to the “satisﬁcing” level 2 (green line), and then from level 2 to the
“optimizing” level 1 (red line). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
same absolute range (between 0 and 10 000$) as simulated subsidy payments (0—100%). For an exemplary discussion, a tax
rate (7%) and a subsidy (27%) are chosen so that average subsidy payments equal average discounted tax savings.
Both the tax and the subsidy are predicted to increase implementation rates. In comparison, subsidy payments are
predicted to be more effective than an electricity tax on all levels, with the difference being largest for satisﬁcing and
behavioural decision-making. There are two reasons for this: ﬁrst, the type of decision-making on levels 2 and 3 means that
future tax savings are only considered within the individual payback thresholds. On level 3, the relative effectiveness of taxes
is further lowered by the behavioural focus on upfront costs. As a result, taxes only increase the NPB to the full potential
extent on level 1. Second, for the given range of data, the implementation rates show a higher (and increasing) sensitivity
towards reduced upfront costs, while there is a lower (and decreasing) sensitivity towards price increases — for all levels.
This is why even on the optimizing level 1, the tax is less effective. For the exemplary values of a 27% subsidy and a 7% tax
(which increase the net-present value by the same absolute amount), the subsidy (+5.2p.p.–+9.6p.p) is between four and
ﬁve times more effective than the tax (+1.2p.p.–+2.0p.p).
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With respect to levels, both policies’ effectiveness is highest on levels 2 and 3: compared to level 1, lower initial implemen-
tation rates translate into larger sensitivities towards policies. As in the sensitivity analysis, there is an inverse relationship
between a policy’s potential effectiveness and the initial implementation rate without it (although the mean NPBs increase
in a perfectly linear way). On level 1, with a high initial rate of 81%, an ever large change in the mean NPB is needed for an
any additional increase by 1 p.p..
4.5.4. The impact of information campaigns
Given the different implementation rates on different levels, there is a potential alternative to monetary incentives:
inﬂuencing the method how ﬁrms assess a green technology investment. If it is possible to shift their decision-making towards
a more conscious level (e.g. from behavioural to satisﬁcing), this could potentially be more effective (and probably cheaper)
than marginally incentivising decisions within a level. As an example, Fig. 6 illustrates a gradual shift in decision-making
from level 3 to 2, followed by a gradual shift to level 1.
Such policies could be the promotion of energy audits or training programmes for professionals, both of which may
counteract behavioural barriers (Grubb, 2014). After energy audits in Australia, 80% of ﬁrms reported that they at least
perform a payback threshold analysis of recommended projects (while 30% perform NPV calculations) (Harris et al., 2000).
Indeed, industrial energy audits are generally found to lower investment barriers, thereby increasing investments in energy
efﬁciency in a cost-effective way (Harris et al., 2000; Anderson and Newell, 2004; Schleich, 2004; Trianni et al., 2016). In a
recent review, Thollander et al. (2015) conclude that subsidised audits are most cost-effective from a government’s point
of view. This evidence from the literature suggests that our match of observed implementation rates to the satisﬁcing level
may  well be attributed to the energy audits themselves, and that real implementation rates could well be at the behavioural
level without energy audits, with very low implementation rates.
Although from the modeller’s and policy maker’s perspective there remains uncertainty on how ﬁrms really make deci-
sions, such shifting policies are likely to be quite robust: if, for example, we  assume that all ﬁrms are of the optimizing
type (and no further shift is possible), within a fully rational framework the policy could still increase the  value, thus
counteracting the undervaluation of future beneﬁts by providing more reliable information. Since they do not depend on
cash transfers, such policies have the additional advantage that they reduce the risk of ‘free riding’ that comes along with
subsidies.
5. Discussion and conclusion
The model introduced simulates technology adoption by heterogeneous ﬁrms in the context of behavioural heterogeneity
and complexity. Simulations that were derived from it support the hypothesis that behavioural aspects account for the larger
part of the energy efﬁciency gap, the gap between a normative benchmark and observed investments into green technolo-
gies. Despite there still being limited knowledge on what really drives ﬁrms’ decisions, the inclusion of psychological and
organisational ﬁndings increases the model’s predictive power signiﬁcantly compared to a classical optimisation approach.
From a practical viewpoint, this allows for testing the robustness of policies ex ante, to adjust them accordingly, and perhaps
save governments time and money. From a theoretical perspective, this contributes to strengthen our understanding of what
may enable or inhibit sustainability transitions from a microeconomic perspective.
The model was structured according to three levels of decision-making: optimizing, satisﬁcing and behavioural, as well as
an ensemble model that combines all three levels. For every level, the model simulated the adoption of a green technology
from a macro perspective. Using a case study of energy-efﬁcient electric motors, the model predicts an implementation
rate as high as 81% on the optimizing level 1. When taking into account satisﬁcing and behavioural decision-making, the
predicted rate is reduced to 44% on level 2 and 20% on level 3. The reported implementation rate of 45% after energy audits is
therefore consistent with the model’s prediction for the satisﬁcing level, as well as the 52% predicted by the ensemble model.
Considering evidence from the literature, we conclude that energy audits likely inﬂuence ﬁrms’ decision-making behaviour.
In order to fully demonstrate this, further research is required on how audits inﬂuence the micro-level behaviour, especially
a comparison of post audit outcomes relative to counterfactual decision-making in the absence of audits.
Behavioural aspects and heterogeneity signiﬁcantly impact the effectiveness of market-based policies. Investment sub-
sidies are predicted to have a relatively larger impact than an electricity tax — mainly due to the larger focus on upfront
costs, but also due to higher sensitivities towards reduced investment costs relative to increases in the electricity price, in
the given range of data. In aggregate, a subsidy is predicted to be more than four times as effective for inducing technology
uptake as a tax, even when both have the same (discounted) value in US$. However, the largest effect could potentially be
achieved by shifting the investment decision to another level — for example, by providing targeted audits to ﬁrms, aimed
at changing the way with which decisions are taken. In language of transitions theory and the multi-level perspective, this
means changing the heuristics and routines for decision-making within the socio-technical regime.
With respect to the research design, the model is limited to a static analysis of present day technology adoption. It
could, however, be coupled to dynamic simulations of technology diffusion, driven by adoption decision-making (e.g. as in
evolutionary models such as in Mercure, 2012, 2015; Mercure et al., 2014). Such a method could provide a ﬁrm basis for
simulating the decisions of heterogeneous agents under bounded rationality and expectations, in order to derive resulting
diffusion dynamics, and dynamics of evolving aggregate energy efﬁciency. In more general terms, this model structure can
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also help better understand what we mean with the ‘representative agent’ in conventional economic analysis, by unpacking
levels of understanding over agent characteristics.
It is clear that when invoking an explanation for observed behaviour using the generalisation of a micro-model, out-
comes may  become driven by the choice of agent characteristics and/or decision rules. Therefore, the rules chosen must
be the simplest and most general possible that produce the model richness required to explain existing data. It is possible
that some macro-behaviour aspects are the result of other unexplored emergent properties from the complex underlying
system (e.g. see Kirman, 1992). Although here we  ﬁnd this unlikely, more empirical research is needed, in order to clearly
demonstrate whether other decision rules could explain better our data (e.g. information asymmetry, information cascades,
social inﬂuence, etc.).
Policy-makers need to be made better aware that green technology investments are governed by complex behavioural
processes, and that ﬁrms behave in different ways. Four key insights can be taken home for improved policy-making: (1)
Behavioural aspects have a considerable effect on green technology investments. (2) The large gap between normative-
optimizing and positive analysis (the energy efﬁciency gap) is at least partly predictable based on the degree of agent
heterogeneity and known behavioural barriers. A model simulation based on randomised distributions can provide the
policy maker with an estimate. (3) A consideration of behavioural factors can increase the robustness of policies. (4) Policies
aimed at inﬂuencing the process and method of decision-making can be at least as effective, and likely more effective, than
ﬁnancial incentives, to increase rates of adoption of green investments.
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